FS#69164 - [linux-hardened] explanation of FS#63295

Attached to Project: Arch Linux
Opened by Michal Svoboda (pht) - Friday, 01 January 2021, 09:40 GMT
Last edited by Doug Newgard (Scimmia) - Friday, 01 January 2021, 13:42 GMT
Task Type General Gripe
Category Packages: Extra
Status Closed
Assigned To No-one
Architecture All
Severity Low
Priority Normal
Reported Version
Due in Version Undecided
Due Date Undecided
Percent Complete 100%
Votes 0
Private No

Details

In  FS#63295  it is said that the linux-hardened package will not implement CONFIG_USER_NS_UNPRIVILEGED, instead the correct solution is to make the application that requires namespaces setuid root. I would like to understand the risk analysis behind that. Why is an extra setuid application (which, if exploited, provides complete access to the system) less risky than CONFIG_USER_NS_UNPRIVILEGED?
This task depends upon

Closed by  Doug Newgard (Scimmia)
Friday, 01 January 2021, 13:42 GMT
Reason for closing:  Duplicate
Additional comments about closing:   FS#63295 

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