FS#75102 - [linux][config] enable MOK module signing
Attached to Project:
Arch Linux
Opened by Tobias Powalowski (tpowa) - Friday, 17 June 2022, 18:57 GMT
Last edited by Tobias Powalowski (tpowa) - Monday, 20 June 2022, 05:02 GMT
Opened by Tobias Powalowski (tpowa) - Friday, 17 June 2022, 18:57 GMT
Last edited by Tobias Powalowski (tpowa) - Monday, 20 June 2022, 05:02 GMT
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Details
Patch for enabling MOK user module signing in secure
boot.
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This task depends upon
Closed by Tobias Powalowski (tpowa)
Monday, 20 June 2022, 05:02 GMT
Reason for closing: Won't implement
Monday, 20 June 2022, 05:02 GMT
Reason for closing: Won't implement
>
> This option makes the kexec_file_load() syscall check for a valid
> signature of the kernel image. The image can still be loaded without
> a valid signature unless you also enable KEXEC_SIG_FORCE, though if
> there's a signature that we can check, then it must be valid.
I have a feeling this will break kexec because we don't have a stable signing key.
Also, the patch does not apply.
+# CONFIG_KEXEC_SIG_FORCE is not set
+# CONFIG_KEXEC_BZIMAGE_VERIFY_SIG is not set
https://pkgbuild.com/~tpowa/5.18.5-MOK-enabled/
Kexec only needs to be changed on secure boot enabled machines: lsm=integrity as kernel commandline parameter
It's cleary stated on kernel panic that happens if you don't add this on kernel commandline.
The kexec kernel needn't be signed, it works also without signing the kernel.
So I think it is safe to add those config options to support this security model.
It's not possible to merge it into default linux package. You have to decide which security model should be the preferred and as long we don't have an official Arch Linux signed shim, it's not worth to follow this path right now with an extra kernel.