FS#59690 - [ca-certificates] Reconsider CAcert inclusion
Attached to Project:
Arch Linux
Opened by userwithuid (userwithuid) - Friday, 17 August 2018, 14:41 GMT
Last edited by Doug Newgard (Scimmia) - Friday, 24 August 2018, 03:10 GMT
Opened by userwithuid (userwithuid) - Friday, 17 August 2018, 14:41 GMT
Last edited by Doug Newgard (Scimmia) - Friday, 24 August 2018, 03:10 GMT
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Details
I suggest changing ca-certificates-cacert to not be a
hard-dependency of ca-certificates any more.
My main goal is to prevent CAcert from being trusted in a default Arch base install. Least invasive would be to make it an optional dep, most thorough to remove it and add a "conflicts" to "fix" existing installs as well. |
This task depends upon
Closed by Doug Newgard (Scimmia)
Friday, 24 August 2018, 03:10 GMT
Reason for closing: Implemented
Additional comments about closing: ca-certificates-20180821-1
Friday, 24 August 2018, 03:10 GMT
Reason for closing: Implemented
Additional comments about closing: ca-certificates-20180821-1
A lot has changed since CAcert has been added(+removed+readded) to Arch. From what I gather, CAcert is only in Arch because it seemed like a good idea once and nobody changed it since.
* RedHat/Fedora never added it, Debian/Ubuntu have disabled it years ago (2014/2015), it's optional in SUSE, the BSDs don't have it, actually hardly anyone but Gentoo and Arch still do. It never got included in any of the major root stores (Apple/Google/Java/Microsoft/Mozilla).
* Let's Encrypt provides free fully trusted server certs. Free mail certs from trusted roots can be had as well (why anyone would bother with smime nowadays is another matter).
* Meanwhile Google, Mozilla and others have actually done a lot to fix the "broken" CA system so that you might actually be able to - somewhat - trust the public CAs in the root programs soon. This does not apply to CAcert though, both in terms of policies/audits but also in terms of real-world technical differences, i.e. Certificate Transparency enforcement. Security improvements that made it into the Baseline requirements for CAs or Mozilla/Google policy are not implemented by CAcert. Though I doubt they do, CAcert still _could_ pretty much sign and MITM whatever and nobody would notice or care - like in the good old days or on systems with a private CA installed.
* Is there even any real-world use case for having CAcert trusted in Arch when nobody else trusts it or ever will? On the other hand, the presence of a legacy root cert with no oversight from anyone or anything could very well be considered a security risk.
I'd just suggest there's a period of "depreciation" when people would be clearly informed of the removal of the package (and their options).